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1The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability
INTRODUCTION
Aims of the Guidelines
The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability aim to assist 
all those seeking to make or evaluate decisions on amnesties and 
accountability in the midst or in the wake of conflict or repression. 
The Guidelines:
•	 identify	the	multiple	obligations	and	objectives	facing	states	in	
protecting human rights
•	 explain	the	legal	status	of	amnesties	within	the	framework	of	
the multiple legal obligations that states must reconcile
•	 assist	states	in	recognising	the	positive	role	of	certain	forms	
of amnesty in advancing transitional policy and conflict 
transformation goals
•	 present	ways	that	amnesties	and	any	associated	processes	or	
institutions can be designed to complement accountability
•	 recommend	approaches	that	allow	public	participation	and	
independent review of decisions to enact and grant amnesty
The Guidelines are divided into four parts: general principles; 
scope of amnesty; amnesty conditions; and amnesty adoption, 
implementation and review. All guidelines should be interpreted in 
accordance with the General Principles in Part A.
Expert Group Composition
The Belfast Guidelines were drafted by an Expert Group of 
internationally respected human rights and conflict resolution 
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scholars and practitioners. Within the necessary constraints of 
keeping the group to a workable size, participants were identified 
based on multiple criteria:
•	 Geography: to reflect different world regions and areas in which 
there is recent experience of dealing with gross violations of 
human rights
•	 Disciplinary/Professional Expertise: to bring together leading 
figures in a range of scholarly and practitioner backgrounds, 
including law, criminology, psychology and political science
•	 Approach to Amnesty: to solicit diverse views on how 
amnesties can be used in the midst or in the wake of mass 
atrocities
The members of the Expert Group were:1
•	 Barney	Afako,	Ugandan	lawyer	and	a	legal	consultant	in	peace	
processes in Uganda and Darfur, Sudan
•	 Mahnoush	H.	Arsanjani,	Commissioner,	Bahrain	Independent	
Commission of Inquiry and former Director of the Codification 
Division, UN Office of Legal Affairs
•	 Christine	Bell,	Professor	of	Public	International	Law,	Edinburgh	
University
•	 Chaloka	Beyani,	Senior	Lecturer	in	International	Law,	London	
School of Economics and UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons
•	 Michael	Broache,	Fellow	in	the	Doctorate	Political	Science	
program at Columbia University
•	 Colm	Campbell,	Professor	of	Law,	Transitional	Justice	Institute,	
University of Ulster
•	 Mark	Freeman,	Executive	Director,	Institute	for	Integrated	
Transitions
•	 Tom	Hadden,	Emeritus	Professor	of	Law,	Queen’s	University	
Belfast and Professor of Law, Transitional Justice Institute, 
University of Ulster
•	 Brandon	Hamber,	Professor	of	Peace	and	Conflict	and	Director,	
International Conflict Research Institute, University of Ulster
•	 Hurst	Hannum,	Professor	of	International	Law,	Fletcher	School	
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
•	 David	Kretzmer,	Emeritus	Professor	of	International	Law,	
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
•	 Suzannah	Linton,	Professor	of	International	Law,	Bangor	Law	
School
•	 Kieran	McEvoy,	Professor	of	Law	and	Transitional	Justice,	
Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queen’s University 
Belfast
•	 Louise	Mallinder,	Reader	in	Human	Rights	and	International	
Law, Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster
•	 William	A.	Schabas,	Professor	of	International	Law,	Middlesex	
University; and Professor of Human Rights and Chairman, Irish 
Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland Galway
•	 Ronald	C.	Slye,	Professor	of	Law,	Seattle	University	School	
of Law; and a commissioner on the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation	Commission,	Kenya
•	 Yasmin	Sooka,	Executive	Director,	Foundation	for	Human	
Rights, South Africa
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•	 Joe	William,	Founder	Director	and	Senior	Advisor,	National	
Peace Council of Sri Lanka, Former Senior Development 
Advisor, Program Support Unit in Sri Lanka of the Canadian 
International Development Agency, and PhD student, School of 
Social and International Studies, University of Bradford
Members of the Expert Group held workshops during 2011 and 
2012. It was agreed at the outset that no member should be entitled 
to enter a personal dissent or reservation. The Guidelines thus 
reflect the consensus opinion of the Expert Group.
Before publication, the Guidelines were circulated to practitioners 
and scholars identified by the project experts as part of a 
confidential consultation process in an effort to ensure that the 
Guidelines are responsive to the needs of multiple actors and 
reflective of diverse views on amnesties.
The Evidence Base
The recommendations adopted in the Guidelines draw on extensive 
sources and evidence including:
•	 international	treaties	and	customary	international	law
•	 decisions	by	international	criminal	courts	and	human	rights	
bodies
•	 UN	declarations,	guidelines,	resolutions	and	other	standards
•	 policy	papers	of	the	UN	and	other	international	organisations
•	 national	legislation
•	 national	case	law
•	 truth	commission	reports
•	 peace	agreements
•	 scholarly	writings
•	 views	expressed	by	the	Expert	Group
•	 feedback	received	during	the	consultation	process
The evidence underpinning each Guideline is briefly reviewed in the 
accompanying Explanatory Guidance. In addition, the Commentary 
to the Guidelines will provide a detailed analysis of all relevant 
evidence.2 This will inter alia provide specific examples of where 
states have adopted measures such as those proposed in the 
Guidelines.
In assessing the legitimacy and legality of various forms of 
amnesty, the Guidelines refer to the status of amnesties under 
current formulations of international law. For some aspects of 
amnesty design, such as providing mechanisms for greater victim 
participation, no direct international legal standards exist. In such 
cases, the Guidelines draw on individual case studies and existing 
research to make policy recommendations.
The Guidelines are not structured as a checklist to determine the 
acceptability of an amnesty, but rather as elements that can be 
combined and balanced against each other to effectively craft 
or reach an evaluation on an amnesty’s overall acceptability. 
Depending on a particular context, some elements contained may 
be more relevant than others.
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A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Balancing States’ Multiple Obligations and Objectives in 
Protecting Human Rights
a) In responding to mass violence perpetrated during conflict and 
repression, states have multiple obligations under international 
law to protect human rights and restore or establish peace and 
stability. With respect to gross violations of human rights3 and 
international crimes, these can include:
i. the obligation to investigate what happened and who was 
responsible
ii. the obligation to prosecute those responsible
iii. the obligation to provide remedies for victims
iv. the obligation to prevent the recurrence of the crimes and 
abuses
v. the obligation to ensure the effective protection of human 
rights for the future
 These obligations correspond to victims’ rights to truth, justice, 
reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence. Where multiple 
obligations are applicable, they often cannot be fulfilled 
simultaneously or rapidly. International law provides limited 
guidance on how states should prioritise their fulfilment. States 
have a positive duty to satisfy each of them as far as possible 
and should seek to develop complementary mechanisms rather 
than fulfilling one legal obligation while neglecting others.
b) In seeking to fulfil these obligations, states may be guided by 
broader policy objectives, which can include:
i. ending the conflict or repression
ii. restoring public order and stability
iii. establishing democratic structures and the rule of law
iv. dealing with the underlying causes of the conflict or 
repression
v. promoting reconciliation, sustainable peace and other 
similar objectives
 Like the obligations listed above, these policy objectives often 
cannot be achieved simultaneously or rapidly and therefore may 
need to be balanced against each other and against the state’s 
obligations.
c) Amnesties can be designed to further a state’s compliance 
with its legal obligations while also meeting its broader policy 
objectives.
2. Accountability
Those responsible for gross violations of human rights or 
international crimes should be held accountable. In addition to legal 
mechanisms of accountability, which normally give rise to individual 
prosecution, there are non-legal mechanisms the use of which 
may,	in	some	contexts,	be	preferable.	Key	elements	of	an	effective	
accountability process include:
a) investigating and identifying individuals or institutions that can 
be held to account for their decisions, actions or omissions
b) holding these individuals or institutions to account through a 
process in which they are to disclose and explain their actions
c) subjecting such individuals or institutions to a process through 
which sanctions can be imposed on individuals and reforms 
imposed on relevant institutions. Appropriate sanctions may 
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include imprisonment, exclusion from public office, limitations 
of civil and political rights, requirements to apologise, and 
requirements to contribute to material or symbolic reparations 
for victims
As discussed in Guideline 5, depending on how they are framed 
and implemented, amnesties can contribute to accountability.
3. The Role of Prosecutions
a) International law creates obligations on states to prosecute and 
punish international crimes (see Guideline 6), and equivalent 
offences are often criminalised in domestic law. Prosecution 
can serve to strengthen the condemnation of these crimes. It 
may also contribute to a number of other legitimate objectives 
such as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and reconciliation.
b) After extensive gross human rights violations or violent conflict 
within a society, there are often substantial legal, political, 
economic, and social challenges to pursuing widespread 
prosecutions. It is rarely possible or practical to prosecute all 
offenders.
c) In practice, all legal systems, including international criminal 
law, allow for some prosecutorial discretion in deciding 
which suspects or which incidents to select and prioritise for 
prosecution. In some, prosecutors have discretion to forego 
prosecution if it would not be in the public interest. Where 
prosecution strategies are developed to select and prioritise 
crimes that will be investigated, decisions will be made not to 
prosecute other offences, or to delay those prosecutions until 
crimes deemed to be of a higher priority have been processed. 
Where mass atrocities are perpetrated, the unselected or 
deprioritised cases may include serious crimes.
d) As discussed in Guideline 5, carefully designed amnesties 
combined with selective prosecution strategies can be 
consistent with a state’s international obligations and can 
further the legitimate objectives of a state responding to 
widespread criminal acts. Depending on their design and 
implementation, amnesties may also directly facilitate objectives 
traditionally associated with prosecution, including deterrence 
(where amnesty is conditional on disarmament and non-
recidivism) and stigmatisation (where amnesty is conditional on 
public confession).
4. The Role of Amnesties
a) Amnesties are used for a wide range of purposes during 
ongoing conflicts and repression or as part of political 
transitions. At different stages, positive objectives of amnesties 
can include: 
i. encouraging combatants to surrender and disarm
ii. persuading authoritarian rulers to hand over power
iii. building trust between warring factions
iv. facilitating peace agreements
v. releasing political prisoners
vi. encouraging exiles to return
vii. providing an incentive to offenders to participate in truth 
recovery or reconciliation programmes
b) In all contexts, where amnesties cover serious crimes, it is 
important to distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate 
amnesties. Illegitimate amnesties are generally unconditional 
and have the effect of preventing investigations and ensuring 
impunity for persons responsible for serious crimes. Amnesties 
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are more likely to be viewed as legitimate where they are 
primarily designed to create institutional and security conditions 
for the sustainable protection of human rights, and require 
individual offenders to engage with measures to ensure truth, 
accountability and reparations.
5. Linking Amnesty with Accountability
Amnesties can be designed to complement or operate sequentially 
with judicial and non-judicial accountability processes in a way 
that furthers a state’s multiple obligations and objectives. Such 
combined approaches can:
a) deliver some form of truth and accountability for cases which 
are not selected for prosecution
b) focus limited prosecutorial resources on those cases which are 
deemed to be of a higher priority or where the perpetrator has 
failed to fulfil the conditions of the amnesty
c) contribute to a broader range of conflict transformation goals 
than an exclusive focus on prosecutions (see Guideline 4)
d) deliver greater consistency with a state’s international 
obligations than broad amnesties that prevent all prosecutions
B. SCOPE OF AMNESTIES
6. Amnesties and International Obligations to Prosecute
a) Accountability should be pursued for international crimes and 
gross violations of human rights but international law allows 
states some flexibility and discretion with respect to considering 
amnesties.
b) No international treaty explicitly prohibits amnesties. Article 
6(5) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, 
which relates to non-international armed conflicts, encourages 
states to enact amnesties at the end of hostilities. As a result, 
the status of amnesties under international law is generally 
evaluated for incompatibility with treaties prohibiting specific 
crimes, with interpretations of customary international law, and 
with the obligation to provide a remedy under international 
human rights law.
c) International crimes, such as genocide, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, torture and enforced disappearances, 
are today generally prohibited by treaty. These treaties require 
states parties to enact domestic legislation to provide effective 
penalties for these crimes. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
also require states parties to search for persons alleged to have 
perpetrated grave breaches with the goal of bringing them to 
trial. The conventions on torture and enforced disappearances 
require states parties to submit cases to their competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, but these treaties 
also stipulate that the authorities shall decide whether to 
prosecute in a similar manner as they would for ordinary 
offences of a serious nature. In making these decisions, national 
criminal justice systems can apply established principles of law, 
for example, by exercising discretion in developing selective 
prosecution strategies. Selective prosecution strategies are also 
employed by international and hybrid courts. As a result, states 
will not necessarily be violating their obligations if, due to the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, they do not prosecute all 
perpetrators or instances of these crimes. Decisions to select or 
prioritise cases should be made on the basis of transparent and 
objective criteria. As indicated in Guideline 5, carefully designed 
amnesties can complement selective prosecution strategies.
d) Crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in non-
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international armed conflicts have been defined in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and where it 
has jurisdiction, the ICC can prosecute these crimes. These 
developments together with the case law of international 
courts and the opinions of authoritative bodies have provided 
greater clarity on the nature of these offences and contributed 
to a body of opinion to support the existence of a customary 
prohibition on amnesties for international crimes. However, 
other sources of opinio juris from domestic and hybrid courts 
together with state practice on amnesties does not reflect an 
established, explicit and categorical customary prohibition of 
amnesties for international crimes.
e) Within international human rights law, there are differences in 
the approach of the regional human rights courts on whether 
there is an obligation to prosecute gross violations of human 
rights or whether it is sufficient that states investigate such 
violations and provide remedies for those affected. Amnesties 
enacted in different regions of the world may be subject to 
different standards.
7. Eligible Offences
a) The criteria for determining which acts qualify for amnesty 
should be clearly specified and limited in scope to minimise the 
potential for conflict with any applicable obligation to prosecute 
under international criminal law or international human rights 
law. Finding a balance between limiting the crimes covered 
by the amnesty and fulfilling the amnesty’s objectives can be 
challenging. For example, excluding war crimes may deter 
many combatants from surrendering, if they are unsure whether 
their conflict-related actions constitute war crimes.
b) Limitations to the scope of eligible offences in an amnesty can 
be made in several ways, including:
i. explicitly listing offences that are excluded from the scope 
of the amnesty
ii. granting amnesty for a non-exhaustive list of conflict-
related or political offences but with guidelines on how to 
distinguish political from ordinary offences
iii. granting amnesty for an exhaustive list of offences
 Where an amnesty is restricted to political or conflict-related 
offenses or where specific offenses are excluded from the 
amnesty, perpetrators of ordinary offenses and excluded 
crimes will remain liable for prosecution. When an offender 
has committed both included and excluded offenses, a 
partial amnesty could be possible. As noted in Guideline 16, 
the implementation of limited amnesties requires individual 
determinations of their application.
c) Subject to a state’s multiple obligations, the exclusion of the 
following acts from an amnesty may serve to increase its 
legitimacy and legality:
i. serious international crimes
ii. other serious acts of violence against persons that may not 
rise to the level of an international crime
iii. acts or offences motivated by personal gain or malice
 As set out in Guideline 8, these restrictions on the acts and 
offences excluded from an amnesty can be combined with 
restrictions on the scope of eligible beneficiaries.
8. Eligible Beneficiaries
a) The purpose of each amnesty and the political circumstances 
within the state will determine which persons an amnesty 
should exclude or include. Domestic and international law will 
also regulate the choice of beneficiaries.
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b) An amnesty should set forth clearly the criteria for determining 
which offenders may be eligible for amnesty, which categories 
of offenders are excluded from the amnesty, or both. 
Distinctions can be made on the basis of
i. allegiance or membership in a particular state institution or 
non-state body
ii. rank within the institution or body, or perceived level of 
responsibility therein
c) Amnesties that distinguish between beneficiaries on the basis 
of their affiliation should take into account any differences in the 
liabilities of persons affiliated with state institutions and those 
who are not under domestic law. These differences can result 
from, for example, domestic regulations on the use of force 
and pre-existing amnesties, immunities or indemnities. The 
different liabilities created for different categories of offenders 
under international law should also be taken into account. For 
example, international human rights law generally applies only 
to the actions of states and some international conventions, 
such as the Convention Against Torture, are applicable 
only to state agents. Applying such distinctions, however, 
may undercut efforts to foster reconciliation among former 
antagonists.
d) Amnesties that distinguish in respect of rank may exclude 
military and political leaders while making amnesty available 
to lower-level offenders. Such distinctions balance amnesty 
with accountability, but can be problematic where high-
ranking individuals are key stakeholders in a political transition. 
Amnesties that exclude high-ranking individuals may draw upon 
the principle of command responsibility found in international 
criminal law, and the prosecutorial strategies of international 
and hybrid courts that focus on those who are “most 
responsible”.
e) Under international criminal law, subordinates are liable for 
international crimes that they commit when following the orders 
of a superior, but they can be relieved of this liability where they 
were under a legal obligation to obey superior orders, where 
they did not know that the order was unlawful and where the 
order was not manifestly unlawful. For all levels of offenders 
grounds for excluding criminal liability include substantially 
diminished mental capacity and duress. In addition, mitigating 
factors such as efforts made by the convicted person to 
compensate victims and to cooperate with judicial authorities, 
and the age, education, social and economic condition of the 
convicted person can be taken into account at sentencing. The 
principles that provide for such mitigation or relief of liability 
could be incorporated into an amnesty. Where lower-level 
offenders are granted amnesty, as explored in Guideline 11, the 
amnesty can be made conditional on their participation in non-
judicial accountability processes.
f) Special attention should be paid in amnesties to the treatment 
of children responsible for acts that may qualify as national or 
international crimes. International law and most domestic legal 
systems provide for a minimum age of criminal responsibility. 
Where an individual is below this age at the time of the offence 
and thus is not criminally responsible, a fortiori he or she need 
not be included within the scope of an amnesty. Where access 
to demobilisation and reintegration programmes is dependent 
on participation in an amnesty process, care should be taken 
to address the needs of children who do not fall within the 
amnesty because of their lack of legal criminal responsibility. 
Children who are above the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility but below 18 years at the time of their offences 
may be liable for criminal prosecution. They may therefore be 
included within amnesty processes, and care should then be 
taken to address their particular needs and experiences.
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9. Temporal Scope
a) To avoid ambiguity, amnesties should state the start and end 
dates within which eligible crimes must have been committed. 
The period between the start and end dates should be the 
minimum necessary for the achievement of the law’s objectives. 
The selection of these dates can affect the legitimacy of the 
amnesty (e.g., where the cut-off dates are used strategically 
to exclude particular notorious events or crimes committed 
by only one faction, or where the start date of a conflict is the 
subject of contestation). 
b) The crime of enforced disappearances has been characterised 
as a continuous crime in international treaties and in the case 
law of some domestic and international courts. Since the crime 
is deemed to continue until the fate of the disappeared person 
has been clarified, amnesties should not bar investigations 
regardless of when the disappearance occurred.
10. Geographic Scope
Where a conflict or policy of state repression primarily affected 
one region of a country, the amnesty may be limited to crimes 
committed within that region. Such limitations minimise the impunity 
granted but can risk treating victims within and outside the affected 
region differently. If an amnesty does not address geographic 
scope, it is generally presumed to apply to the entire country. It may 
also apply to offences committed by nationals outside the country, 
but as discussed in Guideline 18, such amnesties cannot bar the 
state where the crimes were committed from exercising jurisdiction. 
C. AMNESTY CONDITIONS
11. Prior Conditions on Amnesty Beneficiaries
Individual offenders may be required to fulfil specified conditions 
before obtaining amnesty. These conditions may enable an 
amnesty to contribute to preventing further violence and to 
facilitate accountability and the fulfilment of victims’ rights to truth 
and reparations. The extent to which offenders will be willing to 
fulfil such conditions may depend on a range of factors, such as 
the political and security context; cultural approaches to truth-
telling and justice; and the extent to which participation will 
require acknowledgement or repudiation of their past actions. 
Imposing a more extensive range of conditions may result in fewer 
offenders participating, but the inclusion of such conditions may 
serve to increase an amnesty’s legitimacy and legality and further 
compliance with a state’s international obligations to investigate 
and provide remedies. Where individuals fail to comply fully with 
applicable conditions, amnesty should be withheld. Preconditions 
for the conferral of an amnesty may include:
a) submitting individual applications
b) surrendering and participating in disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration programmes
c) participating in traditional or restorative justice processes
d) fully disclosing personal involvement in offences, with penalties 
for false testimony 
e) providing information on third party involvement with respect to 
offences 
f) testifying (publicly or privately) in a truth commission, public 
inquiry or other truth-recovery process
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g) testifying at the trial of those who were not granted or eligible 
for amnesty
h) surrendering assets illegitimately acquired
i) contributing materially and/or symbolically to reparations
12. Conditions of Future Conduct on Amnesty Beneficiaries
a) To increase the legitimacy and legality of an amnesty, individual 
beneficiaries may be subject to conditions that they must fulfil 
in order to avoid revocation of the benefits. Such conditions 
provide a means for the state to hold accountable individuals 
who might abuse the amnesty process, and may encourage 
beneficiaries to contribute to ongoing reconciliation processes. 
However, uncertainty in whether an amnesty will be made 
permanent may make it less attractive for some offenders. 
Conditions that could be imposed for a beneficiary to retain 
amnesty may include:
i. not breaching the conditions on which the amnesty was 
originally granted
ii. refraining from the commission of new conflict-related or 
political offences, or any other type of criminal activity
iii. time-limited bans on owning dangerous weapons, standing 
for election or public office, and/or serving in the police or 
armed forces
b) Some of the conditions for amnesty listed under Guideline 
11 (c) to (i) may be included as a condition of future conduct, 
following the conferral of amnesty, rather than as a prior 
condition.
c) To facilitate the enforcement of conditions of future conduct, 
an amnesty can grant offenders immunity from prosecution 
for a limited period of time, after which the grant of immunity 
would be made permanent if the offender has fulfilled all of the 
conditions of future conduct, or revoked if such conditions have 
not been fulfilled. If the individual were to engage in prohibited 
activity during the applicable period, the temporary immunity 
could be lifted immediately.
d) To oversee fulfilment of conditions of future conduct, a formal, 
independent procedure should be established to review or 
adjudicate compliance. The procedure should specify criteria 
and rules for determining the level of compliance, and the 
decision-making body should be appropriately resourced. 
Where an amnesty is revoked, prosecutions should be pursued 
for the original crime and any subsequent offences.
D. AMNESTY ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND 
REVIEW
13. Adherence to Domestic Law
While all legal systems provide for some form of leniency within 
their criminal justice processes, granting amnesty during or 
following conflict or repression may be constrained by domestic 
law. For an amnesty to be valid under domestic law, at a minimum 
its enactment must adhere to all relevant formal domestic rules. 
Where these rules are not respected, national courts should 
have the independence and authority to declare the amnesty 
unconstitutional or require amendment of the legislation.
14. Method of Enactment and Public Consultation
a) Amnesties may be enacted through a range of executive and 
legislative mechanisms, as provided under domestic procedural 
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rules. The mechanism chosen may have implications for the 
extent to which the amnesty can subsequently be amended 
or annulled. An amnesty enacted through a constitutional 
provision will be more difficult to amend.
b) Public consultation in the design of an amnesty may increase 
its legitimacy. Where appropriate, such consultation should 
include the involvement of potentially marginalised groups such 
as victims, women, children, displaced persons, minorities and 
former combatants. It can take various forms including public 
meetings, surveys, focus groups and the consideration of 
written submissions.
c) Some amnesties have been confirmed by national referenda, 
which can serve to increase their legitimacy. This can entail 
holding votes on a peace agreement or new constitution that 
includes amnesty provisions, thus establishing a link to broader 
efforts to deliver peace and democracy. Alternatively, amnesty 
can be the sole focus of a referendum to ensure that the vote on 
amnesty is not commingled with other issues. Where minorities 
were victimised by a government representing the majority 
community, it may be desirable to ensure that a positive vote is 
obtained in each affected community by requiring an enhanced 
majority.
d) Provision for public participation is one component of amnesty 
design but is insufficient by itself to guarantee the legitimacy 
or legality of an amnesty that otherwise violates domestic or 
international law.
e) “Self-amnesties” are amnesties adopted unilaterally by regimes 
that are responsible for international crimes or gross violations 
of human rights, and which often have seized power illegally. 
Subject to a state’s multiple obligations, such amnesties should 
be regarded as prima facie illegal and illegitimate.
15. Legal Effects
a) Amnesties may have multiple legal consequences for individual 
beneficiaries in relation to the designated offences. These can 
include:
i. preventing new criminal investigations being opened
ii. stopping ongoing criminal investigations and trials
iii. reducing prison sentences
iv. releasing prisoners
v. granting pardons
vi. erasing criminal records
vii. barring civil liability
b) Where an amnesty bars civil liability, either explicitly in the 
amnesty legislation or implicitly where access to civil remedies 
is dependent on prior criminal convictions, administrative 
reparations programmes should be considered to provide 
remedies to victims.
c) If an amnesty process has been designed to distinguish 
between different categories of offenders or crimes, the legal 
effects of the amnesty may differ between categories of 
beneficiaries. Offences that are more serious may receive only 
sentence reductions under the law, while less serious offences 
may obtain full amnesty. Such a tiered approach can provide 
an element of proportionality in the legal consequences for 
different categories of offenders and may thus increase an 
amnesty’s legitimacy or legality.
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16. Administering the Amnesty
a) For amnesties with limitations and conditions, a process is 
needed to determine an individual’s eligibility for amnesty. 
Amnesty implementation processes can be overseen by 
domestic courts, advisory bodies that report to the government, 
specially-appointed amnesty commissions, or truth 
commissions with the power to grant or recommend amnesty. 
The institution responsible to administer an amnesty should
i. be independent
ii. represent diverse social sectors
iii. have appropriate skills to implement the amnesty
iv. possess the jurisdiction and legal powers to carry out its 
mandate effectively
v. be sufficiently resourced to make initial determinations on 
amnesty eligibility and, if appropriate, to monitor adherence 
to conditions over prescribed periods
b) The involvement of victims and affected communities in an 
amnesty’s implementation process generally serves to increase 
its legitimacy. This could entail allowing affected victims and 
community members to participate in hearings to determine 
whether individual applications for amnesty should be 
approved. To ensure effective participation, it is also important 
to inform victims in a timely manner of where and when the 
hearing will take place, to provide or enable legal representation 
and/or financial support towards travel or other expenses 
related to attending the hearing, and to ensure effective witness 
support and protection. Where victims will witness offender 
testimony in amnesty hearings, care should be taken to avoid 
the victims’ re-traumatisation. Victims should be informed of the 
final amnesty decision before it is made public.
c) Processes to administer amnesties should take into account 
the procedural rights of amnesty applicants. In particular, 
applicants should be able to appeal decisions of the amnesty-
implementing body to independent courts. 
17. Annulling Amnesties
a) In a few countries, domestic courts or legislatures have 
annulled long-standing and previously implemented amnesties. 
To create the possibility of future annulment, an amnesty could 
make provision for future domestic judicial review. However, 
the uncertainty created by such provisions may undermine the 
ability of the amnesty to contribute to achieving greater stability, 
human rights protections, and reconciliation. Furthermore, 
where an amnesty is annulled, other obstacles to criminal 
accountability may endure. 
b) Where amnesty legislation explicitly limits the scope of amnesty, 
but this scope is extended beyond these limits through overly 
broad case law, the reopening of criminal cases may not 
require the annulment of the amnesty, but rather the consistent 
application of any limitations or conditions within the amnesty 
legislation.
18. International Courts and National Amnesties
a) Although amnesties bar criminal proceedings within the states 
that enacted the amnesty, they cannot bar international, hybrid 
or foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction. Such courts may 
decide under their own jurisdiction whether to recognise an 
amnesty.
b) Where an international or hybrid criminal tribunal has 
jurisdiction, a state may be required under its treaty obligations 
to cooperate with the tribunal. Such cooperation can include 
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surrendering a person who has benefited from amnesty at the 
national level to stand trial before the international court.
c) International and hybrid criminal tribunals are empowered to 
convict individuals, but they cannot declare a national amnesty 
unconstitutional or order a state to annul its amnesty legislation. 
As a result, even where such tribunals declare an amnesty to be 
inoperative at the international level in an individual case, it may 
continue to have effect at the domestic level. In practice this 
can mean that the majority of offenders within the state granting 
the amnesty will continue to benefit from the amnesty.
d) Regional human rights courts can consider whether, by granting 
amnesty, a state over which it has jurisdiction is in violation of 
its international obligations. Where these courts find a violation, 
they can recommend a range of remedies, including ordering 
that the amnesty be annulled. If the state complies with such 
a ruling, it can result in the amnesty ceasing to have effect in 
domestic law.
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on Amnesty and Accountability
Louise Mallinder 
1. ABSTRACT
The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability have been 
developed by an Expert Group of independent, interdisciplinary 
scholars and practitioners from different world regions and 
areas with recent experience of dealing with gross human rights 
violations. The Guidelines aim to assist those seeking to make or 
evaluate decisions on amnesties and accountability in the midst 
or wake of conflict or repression. The Guidelines are divided into 
four parts: general principles, scope of the amnesty, amnesty 
conditions, and amnesty adoption, implementation and review. This 
Explanatory Guidance sets out the law, standards and practice that 
support each Guideline, as well as the discussion that informed the 
drafting.
2. INTRODUCTION
States have used amnesties for millennia to resolve armed conflict, 
to reconcile to the state citizens who breached national laws, and  
to remedy the injustices created by overly rigid criminal justice 
processes.4 In the past, amnesties were regarded as exercises of 
executive discretion to be regulated by domestic law and generally 
received international consideration only when they were included 
in peace agreements between states. The expansion of international 
law following World War II prompted greater international attention 
on the status of amnesty laws, which were predominantly viewed 
favourably. For example, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions 1977 explicitly encourages states to enact the 
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“broadest possible amnesty” at the end of hostilities.5 The Commentary 
on the Additional Protocols notes that this provision is intended  
“to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to 
re-establishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has 
been divided.”6 The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities emphasised the 
importance that the promulgation of amnesty laws “could have  
for the safeguard and promotion of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”7 in its 1983 decision to commission the first comparative 
study of amnesty laws.8 The study described the positive role of 
amnesties as including releasing all political prisoners; encouraging 
“national consensus in the wake of political change brought about 
in a democratic framework;” initiating the “first act in the initiation  
of a democratic process;” and blocking “an internal crisis” or marking 
“the end of an international armed conflict.”9 This appreciation of 
the positive contributions of amnesties to peace and democracy 
frequently prompted organs of the United Nations to call upon 
war-torn states to enact amnesties.10
In contrast, governments wishing to enact amnesties today 
increasingly face international legal, diplomatic and economic 
pressure to refrain from amnestying international crimes and gross 
violations of human rights. This shift is due the expansion of the 
instruments and institutions of international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and 
the growth of civil society organisations that monitor compliance 
with these legal regimes. From the late 1990s, these developments 
gave rise to a growing body of international case law and other 
authoritative opinions that gradually found that where amnesties 
are granted for international crimes or gross violations of human 
rights they breach obligations of states under international law.11 
Furthermore, it is increasingly argued that rather than protecting 
human rights, the impunity created by amnesties may embolden 
“beneficiaries to commit further crimes” and destabilise efforts to 
achieve sustainable peace.12
Despite these developments, states have declined proposals to 
include explicit prohibitions on amnesties in international treaties.13 
Furthermore, amnesties for international crimes and gross violations 
of human rights continue to be enacted, and in some cases, receive 
international support and are endorsed by national courts.14 As 
discussed in Guideline 6, this supports arguments that international 
law allows states some flexibility and discretion with respect to 
considering amnesties. The development of international law and 
practice is however influencing the shape and role of amnesties as 
today amnesties are rarely granted unconditionally to war criminals 
and human rights abusers. Instead, amnesties are now often 
conditioned on individual offenders engaging with processes to 
prevent further violence and deliver accountability, and are designed 
to complement selective prosecution strategies. In such contexts, 
amnesty can be used strategically to enhance the state’s fulfilment 
with its multiple legal obligations.
Assertions of the impact of amnesties on the protection of human 
rights generally treat amnesties as uniform phenomena and do not 
take these changes in their conditionality into account. Nonetheless, 
recent research into the impacts of amnesties has found that 
there is a lack of evidence that amnesties impede human rights 
protections. For example, analyses of amnesties in individual states, 
such as Spain and Mozambique,15 reveal that even amnesties for 
serious crimes can form part of transitions to stable democracy and 
reduced human rights violations. These examples provide a basis to 
argue that, at a minimum, it has not been proven that amnesties are 
inherently harmful for peace or other transitional goals. Recognising 
that amnesties do not always impede the protection of human rights 
does not mean that their use enhances human rights protections or 
that better outcomes would have been obtained if amnesty had not 
been used. Causal arguments that amnesties can enhance human 
rights protections are hard to prove as not all amnesties seek to do 
this. In addition, even where the existence of amnesties correlates 
to improvements in human rights, this is not proof that the amnesty 
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itself was the cause of those improvements.16 In recent years, large-
scale, quantitative, comparative studies have sought to measure 
the impact of transitional justice processes including amnesties on 
improving human rights and achieving democracy. For example, 
Olsen, Payne and Reiter found that where trials or amnesties 
were implemented in the absence of other transitional justice 
mechanisms, neither proved to “have a statistically significant effect 
in improving human rights and democracy.”17 In contrast, where 
transitional states used both trials and amnesty the combination 
produced “stronger democracies and human rights records.”18 Such 
combinations could be achieved through processes of selective 
prosecutions accompanied by limited amnesties, or by sequencing 
trials and amnesty. Olsen et al further contend that where truth 
commissions also form part of a transitional process, the likelihood 
of positive outcomes is even higher.19 Similar arguments were made 
by Ricci who based on quantitative analysis found that countries 
which utilised a combination of amnesties and trials “were more 
likely to have a higher peace sustainability than countries which only 
utilised one mechanism.”20 These studies suggest that amnesties 
if adopted with other transitional justice mechanisms may enhance 
human rights protections, which provides empirical support for the 
approach taken in the Guidelines that as far as possible amnesties 
should be designed to complement mechanisms to deliver 
accountability and truth.
Recognition of the continued flexibility of international law on 
the status of amnesties and concerns about how an absolute 
prohibition on amnesties could affect the protection of human rights 
in countries faced with or transitioning from conflict and repression 
led to the proposal for the production by a group of independent, 
interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners from different world 
regions of a set of guidelines for those seeking to make or evaluate 
decisions on amnesties and accountability in the midst or wake of 
conflict or repression.
The Guidelines draw on international legal sources, such as 
international treaties and customary international law; decisions 
by international criminal courts and human rights bodies; UN 
declarations, guidelines, resolutions and other standards; as well 
as individual case studies;21 and existing research. This Explanatory 
Guidance sets out the law, standards and practice that support 
each Guideline, as well as the discussion that informed the drafting.
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Guideline 1. Balancing States’ Multiple Obligations and 
Objectives in Protecting Human Rights
Determinations of the legality of amnesties often focus on 
whether they conflict with the state’s duty to prosecute. However, 
international crimes and gross violations of human rights create 
multiple international legal obligations for states, which can all 
affect the legality of an amnesty. These include the obligations 
to investigate, prosecute, provide remedies for victims, prevent 
the recurrence of the crimes and abuses, and ensure the 
effective protection of human rights for the future. Guideline 1(a) 
draws attention to all these legal obligations and explores their 
implications for the legality of amnesties. This should be read 
alongside Guideline 6 that explores the parameters of the duty to 
prosecute and Guideline 11 that discusses how the conditionality of 
an amnesty can affect its legality and legitimacy.
It is widely accepted that the human rights obligations of states 
should be treated as “indivisible, interdependent, interrelated 
and of course of equal importance to human dignity.”22 However, 
in practice, conflicted and transitional states may face many 
challenges in fulfilling their obligations (see Guideline 3) and these 
obligations may come into tension with one another. For example, 
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amnesties can limit fulfilment of a state’s obligation to prosecute in 
order to fulfil other obligations, such as preventing further human 
rights violations. Where amnesties cause conflict between a state’s 
competing legal obligations there is no binding law to indicate 
how states should resolve any incompatibilities.23 However, the 
International Law Commission (ILC) recommends that lawyers 
seek to harmonise between competing legal standards.24 It defined 
harmonisation as “a generally accepted principle that when several 
norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, 
be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible 
obligations.”25 Such processes of harmonisation may require 
competing obligations to be balanced against one another with 
the result that some obligations are “limited or tempered” by other 
obligations.26 The case law of international tribunals and human 
rights monitoring bodies also notes human rights obligations are not 
absolute and emphasises the importance of balancing competing 
obligations, even in relation to prosecutions for serious crimes. 
For example, a concurring opinion by the president of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights supported by four other judges in 
the El Mozote v El Salvador case acknowledged the importance of 
balancing the right of victims to peace against the duty to prosecute 
gross human rights violations. This opinion argued “none of those 
rights and obligations is of an absolute nature, it is legitimate that 
they be weighed in such a way that the satisfaction of some does 
not affect the exercise of the others disproportionately.”27 Where 
amnesties create conflicts between states’ legal obligations, 
Guideline 1(a) recommends that harmonisation be pursued with the 
overall aim of protecting human rights and fulfilling the full range of 
states’ obligations to the greatest extent possible.
Policy objectives as well as legal obligations shape the design 
of amnesties and other transitional justice processes. Guideline 
1(b) provides examples of relevant policy objectives, and notes 
that although the fulfilment of all these objectives is desirable, this 
often cannot be achieved simultaneously or rapidly. It therefore 
recommends that these objectives may need to be balanced 
against each other and against states’ obligations.
Guideline 2. Accountability
Accountability has emerged as a core principle of efforts to deal 
with legacies of international crimes and gross violations of 
human rights and Guideline 2 affirms the importance of holding 
perpetrators to account.28 For lawyers, accountability generally 
entails individual or state accountability before (quasi-)judicial 
institutions.29 Guideline 2 draws upon interdisciplinary social 
scientific approaches,30 which generally envisage broader forms 
of accountability that seek to hold not just individuals, but also 
institutions, corporations and other entities responsible for their 
actions; that can be delivered by processes outside formal legal 
institutions; and that seek to contribute to a broader range of social 
goals than those classically ascribed to criminal prosecutions. The 
affirmation in Guideline 2, which is restated in Guideline 6, that 
those responsible for international crimes and gross violations 
of human rights should be held to account draws on legal 
standards as well as social scientific analyses on the importance of 
accountability. 
Drawing on this interdisciplinary literature, Guideline 2 identifies 
key elements of effective accountability processes. Transitional 
justice mechanisms can deliver these elements to differing 
degrees. For example, criminal prosecutions can deliver the 
enforcement dimension of individual accountability through 
conviction and sentencing, but may create incentives for offenders 
to obfuscate rather than answer for their actions.31 Non-judicial 
accountability mechanisms, such as truth commissions, public 
inquiries, parliamentary committees, ombudsmen or human rights 
commissions, vetting programmes and restorative or traditional 
justice mechanisms can identify those persons to be held 
accountable, require offenders to acknowledge and explain their 
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actions or omissions, and impose a range of sanctions. These 
processes can reveal truths that may not otherwise be available and 
reveal wider patterns of abuse or structural injustice. As noted in 
Guideline 15, the sanctions imposed on individual offenders could 
be designed to distinguish the gravity of the offence or their level of 
culpability.
Although amnesties are designed to restrict prosecutions, as 
discussed in Guideline 5, limited amnesties can complement 
selective prosecution strategies. In addition, amnesties do not 
necessarily block the operations of non-prosecutorial accountability 
mechanisms, and as noted in Guidelines 5, 10 and 11, individual 
grants of amnesty can be conditioned on participation in 
accountability processes. As a result, Guideline 2 concludes by 
stating that amnesties can contribute to accountability.
Guideline 3. The Role of Prosecutions
Guideline 3(a) emphasises the importance of prosecutions for 
international crimes and other serious offences and notes that they 
can contribute to the fulfilment of a range of objectives, including 
deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, expression of the values 
of the rule of law, and reconciliation. However, after widespread 
criminality, it is not always either possible or practical to prosecute 
all offenders due to legal, political and social challenges. The 
range of challenges listed in paragraph (b) makes clear why, 
as acknowledged by the UN Secretary General, “[i]n the end, 
in post-conflict countries, the vast majority of perpetrators of 
serious violations … will never be tried, whether internationally or 
domestically.”32 To address this “impunity gap,” the UN Secretary-
General suggested that prosecutors should develop prosecutorial 
policies that are “strategic, based on clear criteria, and take account 
of the social context.”33 This approach is adopted in paragraph (c) 
which draws on the implications of such strategies on prosecutions 
for widespread human rights violations and suggests that some 
prosecutorial selectivity as implemented in national criminal justice 
systems, the international criminal tribunals and hybrid courts may 
be appropriate.34 Experiences show that selective prosecution 
strategies may result in only some offenders being indicted, with 
others benefitting from amnesty. For example, the hybrid courts of 
Cambodia and Sierra Leone only indicted small proportion of each 
nation’s offenders (five35 and 1336 respectively), which left thousands 
of other offenders to benefit from amnesty. Paragraph (d) concludes 
by noting that amnesties combined with selective prosecution 
strategies can be consistent with a state’s international obligations 
and may directly facilitate objectives traditionally associated with 
prosecution.37
Guideline 4. The Role of Amnesties
Guideline 4(a) illustrates how amnesties can be enacted for a 
range of positive objectives. Although the objectives underlying 
an amnesty are rarely fully transparent, acknowledging these 
differences is important as objectives can shape the scope of the 
amnesty, which in turn can affect its legality and legitimacy. The 
Guidelines here and elsewhere use “legitimacy” as a condition 
for policies and decisions relating to amnesty as the drafters felt 
that legitimacy is a broader concept than legality. Legitimacy was 
viewed as relating to the extent to which inter alia amnesties are 
created through democratic and participative processes (see 
Guideline 14), individuals and communities engage with amnesties 
(see Guideline 16), and amnesties form part of holistic strategies 
for peace, justice and reconciliation. Legitimacy is viewed as a key 
component of amnesties achieving positive outcomes.
Guideline 4(b) seeks to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate amnesties. In doing so, in accordance with the 
balancing approach of the Guidelines as a whole, the distinction is 
not drawn solely based on the duty to prosecute, but instead takes 
into account the extent to which amnesty is designed to facilitate 
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or impede the fulfilment of the states’ international obligations and 
policy objectives. Where amnesties seek to fulfil multiple obligations 
as far as possible they are more likely to be viewed as legitimate 
whereas amnesties that aim to achieve impunity without much 
regard to the duty to prosecute, nor a state’s other international 
obligations, are more likely to be viewed as illegitimate. This 
approach clearly distinguishes conditional amnesties recommended 
in Guidelines 11 and 12 from unconditional amnesties (sometimes 
known as “blanket” amnesties), and it should be read in conjunction 
with the rejection of self-amnesties in Guideline 14(e). Guideline 4(b) 
suggests that amnesties are more likely to be viewed as legitimate 
by domestic and international actors where they are designed to 
support efforts to protect human rights through measures to reduce 
violent conflict, to ensure the stability of the transition, to undo past 
human rights violations, and to promote cooperation by individual 
offenders with truth, accountability and reconciliation programmes. 
Examples of international support for such amnesties can be found 
in the policies of international organisations. For example, the UN 
Secretary-General has noted that “carefully crafted amnesties can 
help in the return and reintegration” of former combatants,38 as 
the offer of amnesty is believed to encourage more combatants to 
participate in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
programmes by reassuring them they will not be charged with 
criminal offences if they surrender. In addition, the use of amnesties 
to encourage exiles and refugees to return to their country of 
origin has been supported in the policy documents of the UN High 
Commission for Refugees.39
Guideline 5. Linking Amnesty with Accountability
In general, states do not face an either/or choice between 
judicial and non-judicial forms of accountability. Instead, multiple 
mechanisms can be designed to be complementary, that is to 
operate simultaneously at different levels (international, national, 
or local) or to achieve distinct goals. They can also be sequenced 
to conduct their functions in a particular order. The determination 
of this order could be due to the political conditions or the ability 
of one process to feed into the work of another. For example, the 
findings of a truth recovery process could subsequently be used 
as evidence in criminal proceedings. Amnesties can complement 
criminal prosecutions where they are designed in a manner that 
allows prosecutions to remain possible for crimes (see Guideline 6) 
or offenders (see Guideline 8) that are excluded from the amnesties’ 
scope, or for offenders who fail to fulfil the amnesties’ conditions 
(see Guideline 11). Guideline 5 lists some ways in which these 
complementary processes can be beneficial.
In its 2011 amnesty decision in the Ieng Sary case, the Trial 
Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia 
noted, “[c]ertain conditional amnesties such as those providing 
for some form of accountability have also met widespread 
approval, such as in the case of South Africa, where amnesties 
were granted as part of the reconciliation process.”40 It continued 
that “[s]uch amnesties have generally not been invalidated, but 
rather, applied on a case-by-case basis, depending on a number 
of factors, including the process by which the amnesty was 
enacted, the substance and scope of the amnesty, and whether it 
provided for any alternative form of accountability.”41 The Chamber 
concluded that amnesties for international crimes “especially when 
unaccompanied by any form of accountability are incompatible with 
the goals” (emphasis added) of holding perpetrators accountable 
and providing victims with an effective remedy.42 This suggests that 
where an amnesty is accompanied by some form of accountability, 
courts may take this into account. Guideline 5 takes a similar 
approach by advocating that as far as possible, amnesties should 
be made conditional on individual offenders participating in 
processes that seek to ensure accountability through judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms.
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4. SCOPE OF AMNESTIES
Guideline 6. Amnesties and the International Obligations 
to Prosecute
Guideline 6 addresses the most controversial issue with respect to 
the legality and legitimacy of amnesties. In considering the duty to 
prosecute, the drafters sought to identify the scope of existing legal 
standards and to highlight where the law remains unsettled. Due 
to the contested nature of the duty to prosecute, Guideline 6 sets 
out to highlight areas in which states retain flexibility in determining 
their approach to amnesties. The drafters, however, declined to be 
prescriptive as the legal obligations relating to a national amnesty 
may depend on numerous factors, such as, when the crimes were 
committed, the nature of those offences, if and when the state has 
become a party to relevant treaties, and whether the state is subject 
to the jurisdiction of international courts.
Paragraph (b) notes that no international convention explicitly 
prohibits amnesty laws. Indeed, when the possibility of 
incorporating an amnesty prohibition was debated during the 
negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 199843 and the International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2006,44 it proved so 
divisive among the negotiating states that the resulting treaties omit 
any mention of amnesties. To date, as discussed further below, 
the only explicit treaty reference to amnesties, in Article 6(5) of 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which relates to 
non-international armed conflicts, encourages states to “grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the 
armed conflict” at the end of hostilities.45
The absence of a prohibition has meant that the extent to which 
amnesties come into conflict with international obligations to 
prosecute is generally evaluated based on composite readings of 
three distinct international legal regimes: international humanitarian 
law, international human rights law and international criminal law.46 
This requires engagement with distinct sources of international law, 
including international treaties, customary international law and 
international jurisprudence. The Guidelines take a broad approach 
by referring to the duty to prosecute genocide, serious breaches 
of humanitarian law in international and internal conflicts, torture 
and forced disappearances as well as gross violations of human 
rights. However, to reflect the distinct regimes and sources that 
underpin the duty to prosecute, the Guidelines declined to articulate 
a uniform duty to prosecute applicable to these different crimes 
and violations, and instead, to ensure clarity and accuracy, they are 
analysed separately within Guideline 6.47
Amnesties and Crimes Prohibited by International Treaty
Paragraph (c) reviews the obligation to prosecute created 
by treaties on genocide,48 “grave breaches” of the Geneva 
Conventions,49 torture,50 and enforced disappearances.51 It draws 
in particular on the wording of the conventions against torture and 
enforced disappearances, which state that decisions to prosecute 
those crimes should be taken by national prosecuting authorities 
“in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a 
serious nature under the law of that State Party.”52 In line with the 
discussion of selective prosecutions in Guideline 3, this paragraph 
notes that national prosecuting authorities could rely on established 
discretionary rules, which may in some instances result in a 
decision not to prosecute. This paragraph concludes by suggesting 
that even where treaties create an obligation to prosecute, states 
will not necessarily be violating their obligations if, due to the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, they do not prosecute all 
perpetrators or instances of these crimes. Decisions to select or 
prioritise cases should be made based on transparent and objective 
criteria.
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Amnesties and Customary International Law
Paragraph (c) of Guideline 6 addresses the most unsettled area 
of international law on amnesties, namely the extent to which 
amnesties for international crimes are prohibited under customary 
international law. This is particularly significant for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts as the obligations on states with respect to these crimes 
are primarily subject to customary international law.
According to the International Court of Justice Statute, customary 
international law is derived from state practice (ie actions or 
omissions by states) and opinio juris (ie the state practice must be 
motivated by a belief in the existence of a legal obligation),53 and 
the evidence for both will be reviewed in this section. The case 
law of international courts and the opinions of authoritative bodies 
have contributed to an extensive body of opinion supporting the 
existence of a customary duty to prosecute international crimes. 
However, the drafters were conscious that even if this duty is found 
to exist, it does not necessarily mean that the duty is absolute and 
that it precludes the use of amnesties in all instances. As paragraph 
(c) relates to the existence of a customary prohibition of amnesties, 
rather than a customary duty to prosecute per se, this section 
will focus primarily on sources that relate directly to the status of 
amnesties under customary international law.
Through their statutes and case law, the international tribunals 
and hybrid courts have defined and prosecuted crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts. In doing so, they pronounced on the duty to prosecute 
these crimes under customary international law. In a few cases, 
they have also expressed views on whether customary prohibitions 
on amnesties exist. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia has considered hypothetical (or alleged) 
amnesties for international offences in two cases and found that 
they are prohibited under customary international law.54 However, 
these decisions did not cite any state practice to support the court’s 
position. When the hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia 
were asked to consider the status of existing amnesties, they 
reached different conclusions to the ICTY. For example, the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone which, adopting 
the position proposed by Antonio Cassese, asserted that “there 
is not yet any general obligation for states to refrain from amnesty 
for” crimes against humanity and that “if a state passes any such 
law, it does not breach a customary rule.”55 More recently, the Trial 
Chamber of the Extraordinary Chamber of the Courts of Cambodia, 
which conducted the most extensive review of state practice of 
any international(ised) criminal court, found that “state practice 
in relation to other serious international crimes [not prohibited by 
treaty] is arguably insufficiently uniform to establish an absolute 
prohibition in relation to them.”56 It follows that even among the 
international and hybrid courts, there are divergent positions on the 
existence of a prohibition on amnesty for international crimes under 
customary international law. Article 38(1)(d) of the International 
Court of Justice Statute provides that judicial decisions are a 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”57 These 
decisions are not in themselves sources of law, but rather opinio 
juris on the existence of rules derived from treaty law or customary 
international law.
The existence of a customary prohibition on amnesties for 
international crimes has been proclaimed in a number of “soft” law 
instruments.58 “Soft” law instruments are non-binding on states, and 
their purpose is generally thought to be to promote “norms” which 
are believed to be positive and are therefore to be encouraged 
to have general application.59 However, as with the decisions of 
international and hybrid courts, soft law instruments “may be 
evidence of existing law, or formative of the opinio juris or state 
practice that generates new customary law.”60
In addition to international case law and soft law standards, other 
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sources of state practice and opinio juris that should be considered 
include the existence or absence of relevant domestic legislation 
(either granting amnesties for international crimes or requiring 
prosecutions); state practice in negotiating peace agreements 
that include or exclude amnesty provisions or in giving diplomatic 
or financial support to or rejecting amnesty processes; state 
willingness to include provisions prohibiting amnesty in international 
conventions; and judgments of domestic courts on the legality of 
amnesties. Many of these sources undermine the alleged existence 
of a prohibition on amnesties under customary international law.
State practice on the duty to prosecute has been relied upon by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to reinterpret 
customary international law relating to the duty to prosecute war 
crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. The treaty 
law governing violence against civilians and combatants who are 
hors de combat during internal conflicts, namely Common Article 
3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, creates 
minimum standards of protection for civilians but contains no duty 
to prosecute.61 However, in a 2005 study, the ICRC reinterpreted 
these provisions in light of its views on customary international 
humanitarian law proclaiming that “serious violations of international 
humanitarian law constitute war crimes” regardless of whether 
they are perpetrated in international or non-international armed 
conflicts.62 On this basis, the ICRC has reformulated Article 6(5) of 
Additional Protocol II stating that based on customary law it should 
now be read as:
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power must 
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to 
persons who have participated in a non-international 
armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for 
reasons related to the armed conflict, with the exception 
of persons suspected of, accused of or sentenced for 
war crimes (Emphasis added).63
It further stated that amnesties for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law would be incompatible with the customary rule it 
had identified “obliging States to investigate and prosecute persons 
suspected of having committed war crimes in non-international 
armed conflicts.”64
The ICRC study based its reinterpretations of Article 6(5) and 
Common Article 3 on a review of practice. For example, in justifying 
its more restrictive position on amnesties, the ICRC asserted,  
“[m]ost amnesties specifically exclude from their scope persons 
who are suspected of having committed war crimes or other crimes 
specifically listed under international law.”65 The practice cited by 
the ICRC study underpinning its position included inter alia five 
international treaties (including Additional Protocol II), six peace 
agreements from internal conflicts and national legislation from 
sixteen states. However, the majority of the peace agreements 
and over half of the national laws cited provided amnesties for 
international crimes and gross human rights violations.66 The limited 
evidence cited therefore seems to contradict the ICRC’s justification 
for reformulating Article 6(5).
State practice in enacting amnesty laws has also been reviewed in 
the Amnesty Law Database created by the author. This database, 
which contains information on over 530 amnesties enacted 
between 1945 and 2011, reviews inter alia whether an amnesty 
included or excluded crimes under international law (defined 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture or 
enforced disappearances).67 It reveals that although from the early 
1990s, international crimes began to be excluded more frequently 
from amnesty legislation, amnesties continue to be granted for 
these crimes and that from the late 1990s there has been little 
difference in the numbers of new amnesties that include or exclude 
international crimes.68
In addition to state practice in enacting amnesties, it is also 
important to consider state practice in encouraging or condemning 
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amnesties in other jurisdictions. There have been amnesties 
for international crimes which have received condemnation in 
UN Security Council resolutions, the opinions of human rights 
institutions and statements by some states. However, data gathered 
in the Amnesty Law Database relating to amnesties enacted for 
international crimes between 1980 and 200769 indicates that 
international actors, including states, intergovernmental institutions 
and human rights monitoring bodies, have more frequently 
supported amnesties than publicly criticised them.70 Recent 
years have also seen cases of international support for amnesty 
processes. For example, a 2011 statement by the President of the 
UN Security Council after noting that the Lord’s Resistance Army 
had been responsible for “violations of international humanitarian 
law and human rights abuses” stated
The Security Council encourages the remaining LRA 
members to leave the group’s ranks and take advantage 
of offers of reintegration support. Over the course of the 
LRA’s existence over 12,000 combatants and abductees 
have left the LRA’s ranks and have been reintegrated 
and reunited with their families through Uganda’s 
Amnesty Commission. The Security Council emphasises 
its support for continued efforts across the affected 
countries to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate former 
LRA fights back into normal life.71
This statement did not refer to prosecuting and punishing LRA 
members responsible for international crimes. In addition, in a 
2013 statement to the UN Security Council, Hilde Johnson, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United 
Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan described an 
amnesty granted by the South Sudan government to leaders and 
members of armed groups as “a very positive development for 
stability in the country, and in particular for Unity and Upper Nile 
states.”72 These endorsements of amnesties appear to be motivated 
by a recognition of the role that amnesty can play in encouraging 
combatants to surrender and disarm.
In addition, as noted above, states have consistently failed to 
prohibit amnesty laws in international conventions. Furthermore, 
in the 2012 Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General 
Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International 
Levels, the UN member states affirmed their commitment to the 
rule of law and emphasised its importance to change to conflict 
resolution and human rights, but made no mention of amnesties.73 
This omission is surprising as the UN Secretary General has 
repeatedly called for a rejection of amnesties in his statements 
on the rule of law.74 Furthermore, although some national courts, 
particularly in South America, have found that amnesties violate 
their nation’s constitutions or international legal obligations,75 in 
general, national courts have been more likely to uphold the legality 
of national amnesty laws.76
In sum, state practice suggests that states remain willing to enact 
amnesty laws and endorse amnesties in other states, even for the 
most serious crimes, and have consistently rejected proposals to 
limit their discretion in this area. In addition, amnesties for serious 
crimes have been upheld by some national courts. On this basis, 
in keeping with the views expressed by some hybrid courts, 
paragraph (d) concludes that no settled prohibition on amnesties 
exists under customary international law.
International Human Rights Law
The duty to prosecute and punish is not explicitly mentioned in 
universal or regional human rights treaties. Instead, with respect 
to gross human rights violations, human rights courts and quasi-
judicial bodies that monitor compliance with these treaties have 
read the duty to prosecute into the explicit duty on states to provide 
a remedy for human rights violations.77 The UN Human Rights 
Committee has issued many significant opinions on the status of 
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amnesties under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, however, paragraph (e) focuses on the case law of human 
rights courts with binding jurisdiction, namely the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.
These courts have taken different approaches on whether there is 
an obligation to prosecute gross violations of human rights. The 
Inter-American Court has developed a rejection of broad, unconditional 
amnesties for serious human rights violations.78 Its jurisprudence 
has confirmed that where gross human rights violations have 
occurred, states must investigate, try, and where appropriate punish 
those responsible, and provide reparations to victims. The court has 
not ruled on conditional amnesties or amnesties that are combined 
with prosecutions. When it considered the reduced sentence regime 
for crimes against humanity created by the Justice and Peace Law 
in Colombia, the court rejected requests from the victims’ lawyers 
to find that that it violated the convention.79 Furthermore, as noted 
above, a concurring opinion in the El Mozote v El Salvador case 
acknowledged that post-conflict states might need to balance the 
duty to prosecute against victims’ right to peace.
Unlike its Inter-American counterpart, the European Court of Human 
Rights has no direct experience of dealing with amnesties. Where it 
has confronted cases of serious human rights violations, the court 
has declined to proclaim an outright duty to prosecute. Instead, in 
the 1996 Aksoy v Turkey case, the European Court of Human Rights 
said that with respect to violations of the right to life “the notion of 
an ‘effective remedy’ entails a thorough and effective investigation 
capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those 
responsible.”80 The phrase “capable of leading to” describes the 
quality of the investigation, rather than imposing an obligation on 
the state to prosecute and punish those responsible. In recent 
decisions, the Court has commented, obiter, that amnesties for 
war crimes and torture committed by state agents would not be 
permissible under international law.81 However, in Tarbuk v Croatia 
the Court held
even in such fundamental areas of the protection of 
human rights as the right to life, the State is justified 
in enacting, in the context of its criminal policy, any 
amnesty laws it might consider necessary, with the 
proviso, however, that a balance is maintained between 
the legitimate interests of the State and the interests of 
individual members of the public.82
To date, the court has not ruled directly on whether a specific 
national amnesty is compatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. However, it can be inferred that the court might 
be tolerant of amnesties for gross human rights violations, such 
as violations of the right to life, and of amnesties that are enacted 
to deliver legitimate state interests such as achieving peace and 
reconciliation, and which seek to fulfil the needs of victims by for 
example facilitating investigations.83
In conclusion, Paragraph (e) emphasises that regional differences 
exist in the duty to prosecute under international human rights 
law and that as a result, the legality and legitimacy of amnesties 
enacted in different parts of the world would be subject to different 
standards.
Guideline 7. Eligible Offences
The purpose of Guideline 7 is to provide guidance on the offences 
to be covered in amnesties. To minimise the potential for the 
amnesty to conflict with any applicable domestic or international 
law, paragraph (a) recommends that the criteria for determining 
which offences can be amnestied be clearly specified and limited. 
Paragraph (b) illustrates some options for limiting the material scope 
of amnesties including explicitly excluding crimes from the amnesty; 
limiting the amnesty to an exhaustive list of offences; or granting 
amnesty for a non-exhaustive category of offences such as political 
crimes but with guidelines on how this should be interpreted. 
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Approaches used in amnesty legislation to distinguish political 
offences from common crimes have included limiting the amnesty 
to an exhaustive list of specified political offences, such as: treason; 
counter-insurgency; sedition; forgery; anti-government propaganda; 
possessing illegal weapons; espionage; membership of banned 
political or religious organisations; desertion; and defamation.84 An 
alternative approach is to grant amnesty for a non-exhaustive list of 
political offences but with guidelines on how to distinguish political 
from ordinary offences.85 To date, the most thorough consideration 
of political crimes relating to amnesty laws occurred in South 
Africa.86 In line with the Guideline 5, on the designing amnesties 
to complement selective prosecutions, paragraph (b) notes that 
where crimes are excluded from the amnesty, they remain liable for 
prosecution and it that may be possible for an individual offender 
to benefit from an amnesty for eligible offences but to remain liable 
for prosecution for ineligible offences. This paragraph should be 
read together with the discussion in Guideline 16 on the creation of 
amnesty implementation processes to determine whether offences 
or offenders are eligible for amnesty.
Paragraph (c) highlights crimes that are commonly excluded from 
amnesties: namely, international crimes and other serious acts of 
violence against persons,87 and crimes committed for personal gain 
or malice.88 This paragraph notes that excluding international crimes 
or other serious acts of violence might enhance the legitimacy and 
legality of the amnesty. However, due to the flexibility in the duty to 
prosecute and the context-specific nature of a state’s obligations 
outlined above, and a recognition of the positive roles that 
amnesties can play in conflict or transitional settings (see Guideline 
4), the drafters declined to articulate an absolute rule on excluding 
any categories of offences.
Guideline 8. Eligible Offenders
Guideline 8 addresses the personal scope of amnesties. Paragraph 
(a) notes that depending on an amnesty’s purposes (see Guideline 
4), and applicable requirements of international and domestic 
law, an amnesty can be designed to target different groups 
of individuals. In keeping with the approach elsewhere in the 
Guidelines, the personal coverage of the amnesty should be made 
explicit and limited. Amnesties can specify categories of persons 
who are eligible or illegible for amnesty. The identification of 
categories can be made on a range of bases including affiliation, 
rank and age.
Affiliation
In identifying potential amnesty beneficiaries by affiliation, 
distinctions are commonly drawn between state and non-state 
actors. However, within these broad categories, amnesties 
can distinguish further by identifying persons based on their 
membership of particular institutions, political organisations or 
armed groups. Distinctions by affiliation may depend on the legal 
status of the persons concerned as state and non-state actors 
can be treated differently under domestic and international law. 
Under domestic law, state forces generally have a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force, whereas armed opposition groups are 
usually prohibited. As a result, guerrilla forces may be liable for 
prosecution for engaging in combat whereas state forces could be 
portrayed as upholding, rather than breaching the law. Measures 
such as indemnity laws and emergency laws may also limit the 
criminal liability of state forces with the result that “state agents may 
have less need of amnesty than non-state actors.”89 International 
human rights law has traditionally been viewed as covering only 
the actions of states vis-à-vis their citizens, but not those of private 
actors, such as non-state armed groups.90 This distinction is 
evident in the Convention Against Torture and the Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which 
apply only to crimes committed by state agents.91 In contrast, 
where offenders commit international crimes, they can be liable for 
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prosecution regardless of affiliation. Paragraph (c) recommends that 
amnesty design should take into account the existence or absence 
of liability for different categories of offenders.
Rank or Perceived Level of Responsibility of Offenders
Amnesties may distinguish offenders based on their rank within 
state institutions or non-state entities. Such distinctions can also be 
based on offenders’ perceived level of responsibility for notorious 
or egregious crimes. Distinctions based on rank may explicitly 
exclude high-ranking offenders, whilst granting amnesty to lower-
level offenders,92 or may use a combination of amnesty, trials and 
other transitional justice mechanisms to address different levels of 
responsibility among offenders.93
Guideline 8(d) refers to the principle of command responsibility as 
formulated in the Rome Statute94 and the prosecutorial strategies 
of international and hybrid courts that emphasise the importance 
of prosecuting those who are “most responsible,”95 as potential 
models for identifying high-ranking individuals to be excluded 
from amnesties. The drafters declined in Guideline 8(d) to state 
that amnesties for high-ranking individuals are prima facie illegal 
and illegitimate due to recognition that in some circumstances 
amnesties for these individuals may be required to remove them 
from public office and prevent them from disrupting the transition. 
Furthermore, the transitions in South Africa and Northern Ireland 
provide examples of instances where former leaders of armed 
groups have played a valuable leadership role in transitions.
In addressing amnesty for lower-level offenders, paragraph (c) refers 
to international criminal law standards on superior orders.96 It also 
invokes standards on excluding criminal liability97 and mitigating 
factors, which can apply to offenders of all ranks.98 These provisions 
illustrate that there are recognised grounds for relieving or reducing 
punishments based on the individual circumstances or actions of 
the offender, even for the most serious offences. Guideline 8(c) 
recommends that these grounds could in some circumstances 
justify the use of amnesties for lower-level offenders.
Age
Drawing on the provisions of the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), paragraph (d) states that special attention should 
be paid in amnesties to the treatment of children responsible 
for acts that may qualify as national or international crimes. This 
should consider whether children are below the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility at the time they committed their offences.99 
Children who have not reached the age of criminal responsibility 
are not liable for prosecution and hence do not require an amnesty. 
In many contexts, accessing reintegration programmes may be 
dependent on participation in an amnesty process. Where children 
are exempted from these processes, there may be a case for the 
creation of separate structures to take account of their particular 
needs.
Children who are above the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
but below 18 years at the time they committed their offences may 
be liable for prosecution. The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child recommends that “whenever appropriate and desirable,” 
states should employ “measures for dealing with such children 
without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human 
rights and legal safeguards are fully respected.”100 In line with the 
CRC, paragraph (f) highlights that these children can be included 
in amnesties but recommends that their particular needs should be 
addressed in rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.
Guideline 9. Temporal Scope
Start and End Dates
The scope of amnesty laws can be limited by specifying a period 
of application within which the offences eligible for amnesty were 
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committed, with crimes falling outside this period remaining liable 
for prosecution. To avoid ambiguity and overly broad interpretations 
of their scope, in specifying this period of application, the amnesty 
should clearly state the start date (ie the date after which the 
crimes must have been committed), and the end date (ie the date 
by which the crimes must have been committed). Such clear dates 
are explicit in the amnesties for Chile,101 Brazil,102 Nicaragua,103 and 
Albania 1997.104
Enforced Disappearances
The crime of enforced disappearances has been characterised as 
a continuous crime in international treaties105 and the case law of 
domestic and international courts.106 This means that the crime 
begins at the time of the disappearance and continues until the 
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person is made known.107 
Drawing on these standards, Guideline 9(b) provides amnesties 
cannot bar investigations while the fate of the disappeared person 
remains unresolved.
Guideline 10. Geographic Scope
Where violence and criminality primarily affected one region of a 
country, it may be appropriate to limit the scope of the amnesty by 
including only crimes committed within that region.108 Depending 
on the levels and patterns of violence across the nation’s territory, 
it may be appropriate for the amnesty to specify that it applies to 
the whole territory of a state.109 Where geographic scope is not 
stated, there is an “implied presumption” that the amnesty covers 
all eligible crimes irrespective of where they were committed.110 In 
a few instances, amnesties have explicitly granted immunity for 
crimes that were committed outside the territory of the state.111 As 
noted in Guideline 18, courts in the states where the crimes were 
committed or international courts can disregard these amnesties.
5. AMNESTY CONDITIONS
Guideline 11. Prior Conditions on Amnesty Beneficiaries
As discussed in Guideline 1, international crimes and gross human 
rights violations give rise to multiple legal obligations for states. 
To enhance an amnesty’s legitimacy and legality, Guideline 11 
recommends that amnesty beneficiaries be required to participate 
in mechanisms to comply with a state’s obligations to investigate 
crimes, hold offenders accountable, provide reparations to victims 
and prevent further violations. Guideline 11 draws on state practice 
to identify possible prior conditions. In recommending that, where 
appropriate, prior conditions require individual participation with 
these mechanisms, it draws on evidence from truth commissions 
and DDR programmes that the availability of amnesty removes 
obstacles to offenders participating genuinely in these processes 
and as a result enhances their work.112
Individual Applications
Paragraph (a) notes that individual offenders may be required to 
submit individual applications. The level of information required in 
these applications will depend on the objectives of the process, and 
can include requiring offenders to provide details of the crimes they 
committed.113
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)
Where amnesties aim to reduce violence or end conflict, as 
discussed in Guideline 4, paragraph (b) notes that they can be 
conditional on participation in DDR programmes.114 Examples 
of amnesties in which offenders were required to disarm and 
demobilise include Congo in 1999;115 Aceh in 2005;116 and Solomon 
Islands in 2000.117
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Traditional or Restorative Justice
Guideline 11(c) is derived from the growing recognition within 
international policymaking and practice of the value of traditional 
or restorative approaches in addressing criminality or wrongdoing 
in transitional or post-conflict societies.118 The mandates, 
composition, processes and outcomes of restorative mechanisms 
vary considerably between communities. Academic literature 
identifies core elements of restorative justice to include:119 (1) 
emphasising the harms caused by the offenders’ actions to the 
victims and the wider community; (2) seeking to repair the harms, 
rather than punishing offenders; (3) recognising that causing 
harms creates responsibilities for offenders to right their wrongs; 
(4) seeking to reintegrate offenders and through reintegration, to 
break cycles of recidivism; and (5) encouraging the participation of 
all stakeholders including the victims, the offenders, their families, 
and their wider communities in the identification of harms and the 
development of remedies. The remedies imposed by restorative 
processes can include public identification and the imposition of 
obligations to perform community services, to contribute to financial 
compensation for victims, or to apologise publicly.
Truth Recovery
In recent years, it has been contended that states have a duty 
to investigate gross human rights violations, and that, victims 
and societies affected by such violations have a right to truth.120 
As with the duty to prosecute, the duty to investigate is not 
articulated in international treaties, but has been developed by 
universal and regional human rights courts. Where amnesties 
prevent investigations, they have been found to violate states’ 
obligations to investigate.121 Paragraphs (d), (e), (f) and (g) highlight 
that amnesties can be conditioned on offenders engaging with 
truth-recovery processes to disclose information on their own 
actions and the actions of others.122 Such processes can take 
many forms including: truth commissions; public inquiries; civil 
proceedings; “truth trials” before criminal courts that do not lead to 
criminal sanctions; coroners inquests; human rights ombudsmen 
or human rights commission investigations; traditional or 
restorative justice mechanisms; and national archive projects. No 
international court has reviewed the legality of amnesties offered 
in exchange for testimony, but international conventions and the 
practice of international criminal tribunals123 allow for reduced 
penalties to facilitate truth recovery, even for the most serious 
crimes. For example, the Convention on Enforced Disappearances 
allows states parties to establish “mitigating circumstances” for 
persons “who, having been implicated in the commission of an 
enforced disappearance, who effectively contribute to bringing 
the disappeared person forward alive or make it possible to clarify 
cases of enforced disappearance or to identify the perpetrators of 
an enforced disappearance.”124
Reparations
The right to reparations is generally not explicitly outlined in 
international human rights conventions. Instead, human rights 
courts have read it into the “right to a remedy” contained 
in universal and regional human rights treaties.125 Although 
international criminal courts do not have the power to order 
states to pay reparations, the right to reparations is a recognised 
component of their work.126 Paragraphs (h) and (i) identify that 
amnesties can be conditioned on individual offenders contributing 
to reparations programmes through restitution, financial 
contributions and community service.127 Where non-state actors  
are required to contribute to reparations programmes, this does  
not excuse the state from its responsibility to make reparations.
Guideline 12. Conditions of Future Conduct on 
Amnesty Beneficiaries
Guideline 12 addresses concerns that granting amnesty will create 
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a culture of impunity in which offenders will feel able to reoffend 
without risk of sanction. Paragraph (a) sets out examples of how 
amnesties can impose conditions that individual beneficiaries 
must adhere to in order to retain an amnesty after it is granted. 
These conditions are designed to ensure the offenders’ continued 
engagement with processes of peacebuilding and reconciliation and 
to prevent recidivism. The value of such conditions was recognised 
by the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
its final report.128 For conditions regulating the future conduct of 
amnesty beneficiaries to be effective, Guideline 12(d) recommends 
that a formal, independent procedure be established to review 
or adjudicate compliance, and that where an individual amnesty 
is revoked, prosecutions should be pursued for the amnestied 
offences as well as, if applicable, perjury or any subsequent 
offences.
Adhering to the Conditions on which Amnesty was Granted
Guideline 12(a)(i) suggests that amnesties can be revoked if 
offenders breach the conditions on which amnesty was granted 
or if it becomes known that they failed to fulfil them originally. For 
example, revocations could apply to individuals who were required 
to disclose their offences fully, if it later becomes known that they 
withheld or distorted information. As noted in Guideline 12(b), this 
provision should be read alongside Guideline 11 relating to the 
prior conditions. Examples of amnesty that explicitly provide for 
revocation based on non-compliance include Algeria 1999129 and 
Colombia 2005.130
Refraining from Violence and Criminality
Guideline 12(a)(ii) provides that amnesty can be revoked, where it 
is conditional on individual combatants surrendering, ceasing their 
criminal and/or violent activities, and abiding by national laws, if 
these individuals return to violence and criminality. The range of 
crimes that will trigger the loss of the amnesty should be stipulated 
in the amnesty legislation. Many amnesty laws contain non-
recidivism clauses.131
Prohibitions on Specified Behaviours
Amnesties can be made conditional on beneficiaries adhering 
to permanent or temporary restrictions on their behaviour. Such 
restrictions could prohibit the amnestied person from carrying 
weapons or joining political organisations. The conditions could be 
designed to complement processes of vetting132 by restricting the 
eligibility of amnestied persons to join the armed forces, work in 
public sector posts or stand for election. Examples of amnesties 
that impose conditions on beneficiaries’ future behaviour include 
Algeria in 2006;133 and Haiti.134 Restrictions on individual’s post-
amnesty behaviour should be expressly stipulated in the amnesty 
text.
Temporary Immunity
Guideline 12(c) suggests an alternative approach whereby 
temporary immunity defers the decision on prosecutions until the 
end of an agreed period, when conditions may be more stable 
and the judiciary may be capable of conducting high-profile 
prosecutions in a fair and effective manner. When the period of 
temporary immunity expires, the actions of individual beneficiaries 
should be evaluated to determine whether they should be liable for 
prosecution, eligible for permanent amnesty or face an alternative 
outcome.135 The legislation providing for temporary immunity should 
stipulate the duration of the immunity, as well as the criteria for 
permanent amnesty to be granted or withheld. If during the period 
of temporary immunity, individuals engage in prohibited behaviours, 
the temporary immunity should be lifted immediately.136 Examples 
of states that have used temporary immunity provisions include 
South Africa 1990,137 Burundi 2003138 and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo 2003.139
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6. AMNESTY ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION 
AND REVIEW
Guideline 13. Adherence to Domestic Law
Guideline 13 recognises that some domestic constitutions provide 
rules that govern the adoption of amnesty laws.140 These rules 
can include whether the executive, or legislature, or both are 
empowered to grant amnesty; the types of legislative or policy 
instruments that can be used to grant amnesty; whether it must  
be adopted by a special voting procedure; which crimes or 
individuals can benefit from amnesty; and whether it can apply pre- 
or post-conviction. Where an amnesty does not comply with these 
domestic rules, national courts may declare it unconstitutional or 
require that it be amended so that it conforms to the appropriate 
standards.141
Guideline 14. Method of Enactment and Public Consultation
Legal Instruments
The instruments by which an amnesty is granted can range from 
an executive policy, to executive decrees, statutes, and amnesties 
that are entrenched within constitutions. Guideline 14(a) notes that 
amnesties that are entrenched within constitutions are harder to 
amend or annul the amnesty. Guideline 17 addresses the annulment 
of amnesties.
Public Consultation
Guideline 14(b) draws on the growing recognition of the importance 
of public consultation in the design and implementation of 
transitional justice programmes.142 It draws on experiences to date 
to suggest commonly used methodologies and it recommends 
that, to the greatest extent possible, amnesty design should 
involve public participation, including the involvement of potentially 
marginalised groups. The extent to which consultation is viable 
depends on factors such as security levels, infrastructural capacity 
and whether conditions permit the free circulation of information 
and opinions. Examples of amnesties that have been adopted as 
part of deliberative processes include Timor Leste143 and South 
Africa.144 Public participation may enhance the legitimacy of an 
amnesty, but paragraph (d) notes that public participation is not 
sufficient by itself to guarantee the legality of an amnesty that 
otherwise violates domestic or international law.145
Referenda
Paragraph (c) draws on state practice where amnesty has been 
endorsed through a public vote. This could take the form of a 
referendum on a peace agreement or constitution that contains 
amnesty provisions,146 or a referendum that exclusively focuses 
on the amnesty.147 Referenda can stimulate public debate on the 
amnesty and the past crimes that it covers, and where the amnesty 
is adopted, its legitimacy can be enhanced. However, depending 
on its scope and the enacting state’s legal obligations, as noted 
in paragraph (d), a referendum in itself would not be sufficient to 
transform an illegitimate amnesty into a legitimate one.148
Self-Amnesties
The term “self-amnesty” denotes amnesties adopted unilaterally by 
regimes that have often seized power illegally, are responsible for 
international crimes or gross violations of human rights, and which 
use the amnesty to protect public officials and their supporters 
from all forms of investigation and accountability for human rights 
violations. Self-amnesties have received the greatest scrutiny 
from the organs of the Inter-American system, which have found 
them to violate the American Convention on Human Rights.149 In 
line with the characterisation of illegitimate amnesties in Guideline 
4(b), Guideline 14(d) recommends that self-amnesties should be 
regarded as prima facie illegitimate and illegal.
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Guideline 15. Legal Effects
The primary effect of amnesties is of course to prevent criminal 
prosecutions. However, Guideline 15(a) draws on state practice to 
illustrate that amnesties may have a range of other legal effects. 
As noted in the discussion of Guideline 13, these effects may 
correspond to domestic law governing the use of amnesties and as 
discussed below, they may blur the distinctions between amnesties 
and other forms of leniency, such as pardons. 
These legal effects can apply uniformly to all amnesty beneficiaries, 
or can be used to distinguish between different categories of 
beneficiaries. For example, offences that are more serious may 
receive sentence reductions, whereas less serious offences may 
obtain full amnesty. Guideline 15(c) recommends that it may be 
beneficial to vary the legal consequences of an amnesty among 
offenders to reflect the gravity of their actions.
Amnesties can require the police or prosecution services to refrain 
from launching criminal investigations of persons or crimes that are 
eligible for amnesty. This can benefit offenders who have not been 
identified. Barring the opening of criminal investigations does not 
necessarily preclude offenders being investigated by other truth 
recovery processes. Examples of amnesties that prevent criminal 
investigations include Algeria 1999;150 Bahrain 2001;151 Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1999;152 Mexico 1994;153 Tajikistan 1997;154 
and Burma 2008.155 Recent experiences in Chile suggest that 
where amnesties do not explicitly preclude criminal investigations, 
domestic judiciaries may reinterpret the amnesty to require that 
investigations be conducted to determine an individual’s eligibility 
before the amnesty is applied.156
Where amnesties are enacted when criminal investigations 
and trials are ongoing, their legal effects may include closing 
proceedings that are open. If the amnesty is conditional on 
individual offenders performing specified acts, the trial may be 
postponed or suspended until they have completed these acts, 
and it will only be definitively closed once all conditions have been 
fulfilled. Examples of amnesties that have closed ongoing criminal 
proceedings include the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1999;157 
El Salvador 1987;158 Macedonia 2002;159 Namibia 1989;160 Peru 
1995;161 and Bangladesh 1997.162
Although amnesties are conceptually distinct from leniency 
measures that apply post-conviction, in practice many amnesties 
apply to both persons who have been convicted and persons 
who have not been subject to any legal proceedings. The effects 
of post-conviction amnesties may include immediate and 
unconditional release from punishment; release on probation or 
suspended sentence; sentence reduction; or a combination of 
these measures tiered to take into account the gravity of individual 
offenders’ actions. Examples of post-conviction amnesties that 
applied uniformly to all convicted prisoners include El Salvador;163 
Peru;164 Democratic Republic of Congo;165 and Côte d’Ivoire.166 
Where amnesties are granted to persons who have previously been 
convicted, they have in some instances been used to expunge their 
criminal record.167
Amnesty can impede victims’ ability to access civil remedies in two 
ways. Firstly, the amnesty may explicitly provide immunity from civil 
liability. Examples of such amnesties include Argentina 1983;168 El 
Salvador 1993;169 and Sudan 1997.170 Secondly, an amnesty may 
indirectly prevent victims obtaining redress in legal systems where 
the availability of such redress is dependent upon the existence 
of a prior criminal conviction. In contrast, the following examples 
expressly exempt immunity from civil actions from the scope of the 
amnesty: Argentina 1986;171 Philippines 1994;172 and Democratic 
Republic of Congo 2005.173 Guideline 15(b) recommends that where 
an amnesty bars civil liability, administrative reparations should be 
developed to provide remedies to victims. As noted in Guideline 
11, individual offenders could be required to contribute to these 
programmes.
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Guideline 16. Administering the Amnesty
Implementation Process
The implementation of limited, conditional amnesties requires 
the creation of administrative processes to assess the eligibility 
of individuals. Guideline 16(a) reviews the forms that such 
implementation processes could take and recommends minimum 
standards that should be in place for the implementation to be 
effective, transparent and legitimate. These standards draw on 
recognised best practice that is generally prescribed for truth 
commissions174 and the experiences of amnesty implementing 
processes in diverse states. For example, critiques of the 
Amnesty Committee of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission indicate that where an amnesty is conditional on 
offenders fully disclosing the truth about their actions, the amnesty 
implementing body should be granted sufficient powers to 
enable it to corroborate and challenge the accounts provided by 
amnesty applicants.175 This could, for example, require an amnesty 
commission to have powers to search premises, take statements, 
seize documents, subpoena witness and require cooperation from 
other government departments.
Victim and Community Participation
Guideline 16(b) builds on the commitment to public participation 
outlined in Guideline 14(b) and the principles of restorative justice 
described above, to recommend that where possible, victims and 
civil society organisations be allowed to participate in hearings on 
individual applications for amnesty. Drawing on the experience 
of the Amnesty Committee of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, this Guideline recommends measures 
to facilitate participation.176
Right of Appeal
To respect the procedural rights of individual amnesty applicants, 
Guideline 16(c) recommends that they are granted the right to 
appeal decisions of the amnesty implementing body to independent 
courts.
Guideline 17. Annulling Amnesties
Guideline 17 is motivated primarily by the annulment of amnesties 
in Argentina, Peru and Uruguay over the past decade. These 
amnesties all offered automatic and unconditional immunity for 
gross human rights violations. Their annulment was achieved 
through one or several of the following: judgments by the Inter-
American Court;177 domestic judicial decisions declaring the law 
unconstitutional;178 and national legislation to annul the amnesty.179 
The annulments had retroactive effect that enabled cases that had 
previously been closed by the amnesties to be reopened. To allow 
for the possibility of future annulment, Guideline 17(a) notes that an 
amnesty could make provision for future domestic judicial review.
Guideline 17(b) draws on the experience of Chile where the impunity 
created by the 1978 amnesty law has been narrowed through a 
range of judicial reinterpretations. Early in the transition, limitations 
and exceptions contained in this amnesty were not consistently 
applied by the courts. Recent jurisprudence has entailed inter alia 
applying these exceptions and reinterpreting the amnesty in light of 
international legal developments.180 Although the Chilean amnesty 
has not been annulled, these reinterpretations have allowed the 
reopening of cases that were previously closed by the amnesty. At 
the time of writing, more cases have been reopened in Chile, than 
in the countries where the amnesties have been annulled.181 This 
Guideline therefore notes that reopening cases may not require the 
annulment of an amnesty.
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Guideline 18. International Courts and National Amnesties
Jurisdiction to Rule on Foreign Amnesties
Where individuals who have benefited from an amnesty have 
become the subject of criminal proceedings before an international 
or foreign court, a limited case law has developed where these 
individuals have sought to invoke amnesty to argue that the court 
has no jurisdiction, and that to proceed with the prosecution would 
be an abuse of process. These cases indicate that with respect to 
unconditional amnesties for international crimes, foreign courts do 
not consider themselves bound to recognise amnesties enacted 
elsewhere.182 The ICTY,183 the Special Court for Sierra Leone184 
and the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia185 
have adopted similar positions. Guideline 18(a) concurs with this 
approach by stating that amnesties cannot bar international, hybrid 
or foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction.
International Criminal Tribunals, Hybrid Courts and National 
Amnesties
Paragraph (b) emphasises the duties on states to cooperate 
with international criminal courts. Paragraph (c) then draws on 
the practice of countries such as Sierra Leone, Timor Leste and 
Cambodia to note that although international criminal courts can 
convict individuals who have benefited from an amnesty, this does 
not result in the amnesty ceasing to have effect for other offenders 
(see Guideline 3).
Regional Human Rights Courts
Paragraph (d) notes that human rights courts can evaluate the 
extent to which an amnesty complies with a state’s obligations 
under applicable treaties. As explored in the discussion of Guideline 
6(e), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been most 
active in considering amnesties. Where it has found that an 
amnesty violates the American Convention on Human Rights, it has 
recommended a range of remedies including annulling amnesties 
(see Guideline 17). In the case of Peru, this resulted in the 
amnesty ceasing to have effect;186 however, similar rulings on the 
amnesties in Chile and Brazil have not been given effect by national 
authorities.
7. CONCLUSION
The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability seek to move 
discussion of the legality of amnesties from a predominant focus  
on the duty to prosecute to consider the relationship of amnesties 
to the full range of legal obligations incumbent on conflicted and 
transitional states. In addition, they aim to enhance human rights 
protections by recommending ways in which amnesties can be 
designed to contribute to peace, truth, accountability and reconciliation. 
To enhance their accessibility the Guidelines have been translated 
into Arabic, French, Mandarin, Russian and Spanish. It is hoped 
that the Guidelines will be widely disseminated and will be of value 
to individuals and organisations that are grappling with decisions on 
how to deal with legacies of violent pasts.
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